Module 03
Distinguishing human dignity and moral responsibility from the capabilities of artificial agents.
Identity is more than continuity of access, and dignity is not a permission level. This essay argues against conflating a person with the data construct that represents them, insisting that a humane digital architecture must respect the untokenizable depth of the human subject.
A philosophical clarification of four terms that modern infrastructure frequently collapses. This essay argues that separating the ontological person, the social identity, the active agent, and the system account is necessary to prevent technology from fundamentally miscategorizing human beings.
Exploring the legal, philosophical, and theological dimensions of artificial personhood. This essay dissects the difference between creating a legal status and recognizing personal subjectivity, cautioning against the temptation to confer human dignity upon sophisticated statistical models.
How can machines act without being moral subjects? This essay examines the risks of autonomous agents making high-stakes decisions, arguing that functional capability must not be mistaken for the moral capacity required to bear responsibility.
An investigation into moral responsibility within autonomous systems. When a model acts unpredictably and causes harm, this essay asks where culpability lands, arguing that automation must never become a method for humans to launder their accountability.
How "the algorithm decided" functions as a modern moral escape hatch. This essay explores how bureaucratic and corporate structures use AI to abstract away difficult human choices, systematically removing the face of the decision-maker from the consequences of the decision.
A proposal for systemic justice in an automated age. This essay argues that any consequential automated decision—affecting credit, employment, liberty, or livelihood—must remain appealable to a human being capable of exercising discretion and recognizing context.
An inquiry into the limits of technological substitution. By evaluating roles that depend intrinsically on shared vulnerability and embodied human relationship, this essay challenges the assumption that sufficient capability justifies replacing humans in domains of care and judgment.
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